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CREDITORS' RIGHTS IN LIFE INSURANCE
OSMOND K. FRAENKELt
At Common Law
T HE history of the rights of creditors in the proceeds of life insur-
ance policies has been varied. In the absence of legislation a
creditor of an insured person can, after his death, reach the proceeds
of policies payable to that person's estate.' But he cannot reach the
proceeds of policies payable to any other beneficiary2 except upon proof
tMember of the New York Bar.
1. Milan v. Davis, 97 Fla. 916, 123 So. 668 (1929), cert. denied, 280 U. S. 601 (1929);
Rawson v. Jones, 52 Ga. 458 (1874); Ionia County Say. Bank v. McLean, 84 Mich. 625,
48 N. W. 159 (1891); Remley v. Travelers Ins. Co., 108 Blinn. 31, 121 N. W. 230 (1921);
Rice v. Smith, 72 Miss. 42, 16 So. 417 (1894); Stoudt v. Guaranty Trust Co., 150 M LC.
675, 271 N. Y. Supp. 409 (Sup. Ct. 1933), aff'd, 241 App. Div. 801, 269 N. Y. Supp. 997
(1st Dep't 1934); Skinner v. Holt, 9 S. D. 427, 69 N. W. 595 (1896); Dulaney v. Walsh,
37 S. W. 615 (1896), aff'd, 90 Tex. 329, 38 S. W. 748 (1897); In re Heilbron's Estate, 14
Wash. 536, 45 Pac. 153 (1896).
In Cohen v. Gordon Ferguson Inc., 56 N. D. 545, 218 N. W. 209 (1928), the court
held that a statute which exempted policies payable to the insured's estate did not apply to
a policy payable to the insured himself.
In some jurisdictions a policy payable to "heirs or representatives" is construed as
not payable to the insured's estate, and therefore exempt: Loos v. Insurance Co, 41 Mo.
538 (1867); and similarly as to "heirs and asigns": Hubbard v. Turner, 93 Ga. 752,
20 S. E. 640 (1894); Mullins v. Thompson, 51 Tex. 7 (1879). See also Weisert v. Much),
81 Ky. 336 (1883).
And some courts accept extrinsic evidence to show that the insured meant vAe or heirs
although the policy was payable to his "legal representatives" or "estate." Pa& v. Pace,
19 Fla. 438 (1882); Griswold v. Sawyer, 125 N. Y. 411, 26 N. E. 464 (1891); Rose v.
Wortham, 95 Tenn. 505, 32 S. W. 458 (1895). Contra: Waaon v. Colburn, 99 Mass.
342 (1868).
2. Central National Bank of Washington v. Hume, 128 U. S. 195 (1888); In re Reiter,
58 F. (2d) 631 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932), cert. denied, 287 U. S. 652 (1932); Hendrie & Bolthoff
Mfg. Co. v. Platt, 13 Colo. App. 15, 56 Pac. 209 (1899); Shaver v. Shaver, 35 App. Div.
1, 54 N. Y. Supp. 464 (3d Dep't 1898); Lowenstein v. Koch, 165 App. Div. 760, 152
N. Y. Supp. 506 (1st Dep't 1915), aff'd, 217 N. Y. 689, 112 N. E. 1053 (1916); Elliott's
Appeal, 50 Pa. 75 (1865); Mason v. Martin, 37 S. D. 299, 232 N. W. 29 (1930); Rose v.
Wortham, 95 Tenn. 505, 32 S. W. 458 (1895).
Some cases hold that if the insured was insolvent the policy will be treated as a voluntary
gift subject to creditors' claims regardless of fraud. Fearn v. Ward, 80 Ala. 555, 2
So. 114 (1886); Stokes v. Coffey, 8 Bush. 533 (Ky. 1871); Merchants' and Miners' Trans-
portation Co. v. Borland, 53 N. J. Eq. 282, 31 At. 272 (1895).
Other jurisdictions, while rejecting this rule, have allowed creditors to recover premiums
paid during insolvency and subsequent to the incurring of the debt. Stigler's Ex'x v.
Stigler, 77 Va. 163 (1883). See also Hendrie, etc. Mfg. Co. v. Platt, supra.
35
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of fraud.2 For it is only the debtor's property which may be reached
by a creditor and a policy in which a person is named as beneficiary
is in effect a gift to the beneficiary. However, if the insured reserved
the right either to change the beneficiary or to surrender the policy,
then his creditors may, during his lifetime, enforce the right which was
vested in him.
The Supreme Court of the United States in Cohn v. Samuels4 definitely
determined that in bankruptcy the trustee succeeds to any rights which
the insured reserved to himself. Earlier decisions of the Court bad
defined the extent to which a trustee in bankruptcy could obtain the
surrender value of policies payable to the estate of the bankrupt and,
of course, the same rulings are applicable to policies payable to a
named beneficiary in which a right to change the beneficiary or to sur-
render the policies is reserved. All that the trustee can obtain is the
surrender value as of the date the petition was filed so that if the bank-
rupt dies thereafter and before adjudication his executors are entitled
to the proceeds of the policies less such surrender value.5 Likewise if,
because of loans outstanding on the policy, there is at the time of the
filing of the petition no surrender value nothing passes to the trustee.0
By express provisions of the Bankruptcy Law7 a bankrupt may retain
3. See cases cited in note 2, supra.
There is some question, however, whether the creditor could recover the proceeds of the
policy or only the aggregate amount of the premiums fraudulently paid. See Pence v.
Makepeace, 65 Ind. 345, 360 (1879).
See also Holmes v. Gilman, 138 N. Y. 369, 34 N. E. 205 (1893), in which trust funds
were used for the payment of premiums and the whole policy held subject to the trust
because it amounted to less than the total defalcation, although larger than the trust
funds applied upon the payment of the premiums. Substantially to the same effect was
Shaler v. Trowbridge, 28 N. J. Eq. 595 (1877).
Creditors may set aside a fraudulent transfer of a policy originally payable to the
estate of the insured. Ionia County Say. Bank v. McLean, 84 Mich. 625, 48 N. W. 159
(1891); Weil v. Marquis, 256 Pa. 608, 101 AtI. 70 (1917). But see Cole v. Marple, 98
Ill. 58 (1881), and Bailey v. Wood, 202 Mass. 549, 89 N. E. 147 (1909), to the effect
that an assignment to a wife protects her to the same extent as though the policy had
originally been payable to her.
In Davis v. Cramer, 133 Ark. 224, 202 S. W. 239 (1918), the court, while declaring the
assignment fraudulent, refused to allow the creditor to hold the policy until maturity and
so obtain the full proceeds of the policy, but held he could reach only the surrender
value at the time of his application to subject it to his claim.
4. 245 U. S. 50 (1917). See also Cohn v. Malone, 248 U. S. 450 (1919).
5. Everett v. Judson, 228 U. S. 474 (1913).
6. Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U. S. 459 (1913); Coppard v. Bankers' Life Co., 294
S. W. 237 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927). But this rule applies only when the bankrupt Is the
insured, not when he is the beneficiary. Clements v. Coppin, 61 F. (2d) 552 (C. C. A.
9th, 1933).
7. 30 STAT. 565 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. § 110 (a) (1926). But when a corporation,
which later becomes bankrupt, had insured an officer he could not redeem the policy.
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the benefit of the policy either for himself or for his beneficiary by
paying the trustee the equivalent of the surrender value at the time
of the filing of the petition.
Where no bankruptcy proceedings have been instituted a creditor, by
appropriate proceedings supplementary to execution, may likewise com-
pel the surrender of the policy.s But unless this has been accomplished
before death, or at least a lien has been established, no right accrues to
the creditor.9
Statutory Changes
Statutes have, however, marred the simplicity of the picture just
drawn. Before discussing the various kinds of statutes which have been
enacted it should be pointed out that under the Bankruptcy Law the
extent to which the insurance policies are exempt from creditors' rights
depends upon the statute of the state of the residence of the assured. 0
The great weight of federal authority is to the effect that a statute which
exempts from execution the proceeds of life insurance policies payable
to a named beneficiary is effective to prevent the trustee in bankruptcy
from claiming the surrender value, even though the policy reserved the
right to surrender or to change the beneficiary and the statute did not
authorize such reservation.1' The rule of the federal courts in New
Wolter v. Johnston, 34 F. (2d) 598 (C. C. A. 3d, 1929); Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co. v.
Scales, 62 F. (2d) 582 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933). But see In re Kern, 8 F. Supp. 246 (S. D.
N. Y. 1934), to the effect that this statute does not apply to disability benefits.
S. See Reynolds v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 160 N. Y. 635, 55 N. E. 305 (1899), vhich
allowed such a receiver to recover the full proceeds. See also Lowenstein v. Koch, 165
App. Div. 760, 152 N. Y. Supp. 506 (1st Dep't 1914). But see Farmers' Merchants'
Bank v. National Life Ins. Co., 161 Ga. 793, 131 S. E. 902 (1926), and Columbia Bank
v. Equitable Assur. Soc., 79 App. Div. 601, 80 N. Y. Supp. 428 (1st Dep't 1903), to the
effect that until the insured has exercised an option to receive the cash surrender value
the creditor could not reach it.
9. Lowenstein v. Koch, 165 App. Div. 760, 152 N. Y. Supp. 506 (Ist Dep't 1915).
10. Holden v. Stratton, 198 U. S. 202 (1905). It should be borne in mind, however,
that state constitutions sometimes restrict the power of the legislature to grant exemp-
tions unlimited in amount. In re Jones, 249 Fed. 487 (D. Md. 1917); In re How, 59 Minn.
415, 61 N. W. 456 (1894); Whiting v. Squires, 6 F. (2d) 100 (C. C. A. 4th, 1925);
Duncan v. Barnett, 11 S. C. 333 (1878); Skinner v. Holt, 9 S. D. 427, 69 N. W. 595 (1896).
But in other states similar constitutional provisions have been held not to restrict the
legislature. Miller v. Marx, 55 Ala. 322 (1876); Milan v. Davis, 97 Fla. 916, 123 So. 668
(1929) (an insurance case); Towle v. Towle, 81 Kan. 675, 107 Pac. 228 (1910); Talcott
v. Bailey, 54 N. D. 19, 208 N. W. 549 (1926).
11. In re Pfaffinger, 164 Fed. 526 (W. D. Ky. 1903); In re Whelpley, 169 Fed. 1019
(N. H. 1909); In re Orear, 189 Fed. 888 (C. C. A. 8th, 1911); In re Mor-e, 206 Fed.
350 (D. Kan. 1912); In re Young, 208 Fed. 373 (N. D. Ohio 1912); Jens v. Davis, 280
Fed. 706 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922); Magnuson v. Wagner, I F. (2d) 99 (C. C. A. 8th, 1924);
Ralph v. Cox, 1 F. (2d) 435 (C. C. A. 8th, 1924); In re Stansell, 8 F. (2d) 363 (W. D.
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York, as well as that of a few other jurisdictions, 12 has, however, been
otherwise. It appears to have originated from a misconception of the
New York cases and doubts have recently been expressed as to the
correctness of the earlier rulings.13 Nevertheless, in a recent case these
rulings were adhered to.' 4
The weight of authority has also construed the statutes which create
an exemption and authorizd the reservation of a right to change the
beneficiary or to surrender the policy as exempting completely the sur-
render value of such policies.'" And the Circuit Court of-Appeals has
similarly construed the present New York law on the subject.'"
Nevertheless, it has generally been held that no matter what such
exemption statutes may provide, they cannot constitutionally deprive
creditors whose claims were in existence at the time of their enactment
from reaching the surrender value of policies in which there had been
reserved the right to change the beneficiary or to surrender. In a
recent state case the court limited the existing creditors to policies which
were in existence at the time the new law went into eifect and denied
their rights to policies which were subsequently issued.18
Tenn. 1925); In re Cunningham, 15 F. (2d) 700 (E. D. S. C. 1926); In re Bendell, 28 F.
(2d) 999 (E. D. Mich. 1928); Hickman v. Hanover, 33 F. (2d) 873 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929);
In re Erstine, 41 F. (2d) 559 (E. D. Ark. 1930); Smith v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
43 F. (2d) 74 (C. C. A. 3d, 1930); In re Reiter, 58 F. (2d) 631 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932).
In Whiting v. Squires, 6 F. (2d) 100 (C. C. A. 4th, 1925), a different result was reached
because of provisions of the state constitution.
12. In re White, 174 Fed. 333 (C. C. A. 2d, 1909); In re Samuels, 254 Fed. 775 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1918); In re Greenberg, 271 Fed. 258 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921); In re Ellis, 1 F. (2d)
341 (W. D. N. Y. 1924); In re Solomons, 2 F. Supp. 572 (S. D. N. Y. 1932). But see
Grems v. Traver, 87 Misc. 644, 148 N. Y. Supp. 200 (Sup. Ct. 1914), afj'd, 164 App. Div.
968, 149 N. Y. Supp. 1085 (4th Dep't 1914), reaching a different conclusion; In re Herr,
182 Fed. 716 (M.-D. Pa. 1910); In re Shoemaker, 225 Fed. 329 (E. D. Pa. 1915). See
also Ehrhart v. New York Life Ins. Co., 45 F. (2d) 804 (S. D. Ill. 1929), holding not
within the statute a policy which reserved- the right to change the beneficiary; and In re
Hammells, 5 F. (2d) 879 (D. Ariz. 1925) and Morgan v. M'Caffrey, 286 Fed. 922 (C. C.
A. 5th, 1923), holding the statutes applicable only after death.
13. In re Reiter, 58 F. (2d) 631 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932), cert. denied 287 U. S. 652 (1932).
14. In re Lipton, 4 F. Supp. 799 (S. D. N. Y. 1933).
15. Ralph v. Cox, 1 F. (2d) 435 (C. C. A. 8th, 1924); In re Weick, 2 F. (2d) 647
(C. C. A. 6th, 1924); Brown v. Home Life Ins. Co., 3 F. (2d) 661 (E. D. Okla. 1925);
In re Lang, 20 F. (2d) 236 (E. D. Pa. 1927), aff'd, as Dussoulas v. Lang, 24 F. (2d) 254
(E. D. N. Y. 1928), cert. denied 277 U. S. 593 (1928).
16. In re Messinger, 29 F. (2d) 158 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928), cert. denied 279 U. S.
855 (1929). The court, however, ruled that if the insured changed the beneficiary to
his personal advantage the trustee might recover the surrender value as of the date of
filing.
. 17. In re Messinger, 29 F. (2d) 158 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928). See also cases cited In notes
62, 72-77, infra.
18. Cecilian Operating Corporation v. Berkwit, 151 Misc. 814, 272 N. Y. Supp. 291
(Sup. Ct. 1934).
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So many different kinds of statutes exist on this subject, and there
have been so many changes in the statutes of many of the jurisdictions
that it would be impracticable to deal with them all. In general it may
be said that there are or have been in the past statutes in which the
exemption depends upon the total amount of insurance carried, regard-
less of the person to whom it is payable; 9 in which it depends upon the
character of the beneficiary named, regardless of the amount of insur-
ance carried;"0 and in which all insurance is exemptf'
19. See statutes referred to in In re Hammells, 5 F. (2d) 879 (D. Ariz. 1925); Chat-
tanooga Sewer Pipe Works v. Dumler, 153 Misc. 276, 120 So. 450 (1929); Whitea-de v.
Fischer, 250 N. W. 60 (S. D. 1933). (In the first and third of these statutes the exemption
is only for the benefit of a surviving spouse or child.)
Under such statutes the surrender value is also exempt up to the full amount allowed
as exempt proceeds. Dreyfus v. Barton, 98 Miss. 768, 54 So. 254 (1911); Schuler v. John-
son, 246 N. W. 632 (S. D. 1933).
20. Some of these statutes cover policies payable to the estate of the insured or his
heirs. Mitchell v. Allis, 157 Ala. 304, 47 So. 715 (1903); Larrabee v. Palmer, 101 Iowa
132, 70 N. W. 100 (1897); Jorgensen v. De Viney, 57 N. D. 63, 222 N. W. 464 (1928).
Others apply only if the policy is payable to the wife, or sometimes to the wife or
some other dependent relative. Denkins v. Cornish, 41 F. (2d) 766 (E. D. Ark. 1930);
Pace v. Pace, 19 Fla. 438 (1882); Milan v. Davis, 97 Fla. 916, 123 So. 668 (1929), crt.
denied 280 U. S. 601 (1929); Houston v. Maddux, 179 In. 377, 53 N. E. 599 (1899) ; Scott
v. Wamsley, 253 N. W. 524 (Iowa 1934); Hathaway v. Sherman, 61 Me. 466 (1872);
Ionian County Sav. Bank v. McLean, 84 Mich. 625, 43 N. W. 159 (1891); Baxter v. Old
National City Bank, 46 Ohio App. 533, 189 N. E. 514 (1933); Weil v. Marquis, 256 Pa.
608, 101 Atl. 70 (1917); Cannons v. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co., 208 Wis. 452, 243 N. W.
320 (1932). In Goldman v. Moses, 191 N. E. 873 (Mass. 1934), it was suggested that the
words of the statute being "married woman" the exemption might benefit not only the
wife, but also a married daughter.
In some jurisdictions the statute provides that insurance taken out by a husband enures
to his widow or children free from creditors' claims unless it is made payable to some other
named beneficiary without specifying that the policy must name either wife or child.
Cooper v. Taylor, 54 F. (2d) 1055 (C. C. A. 5th, 1932); Scott v. Wamsley, supra; Rice
v. Smith, 72 Miss. 42, 16 So. 417 (1894); Skinner v. Holt, 9 S. D. 427, 69 N. W. 595
(1896); Dawson v. National Life Ins. Co., 156 Tenn. 306, 300 S. W. 507 (1928). Such
policy is exempt though taken out before marriage. Rose v. Wortham, 95 Tenn. 505, 32
S. W. 458 (1895).
And some states exempt by statute all policies payable to any person other than the
insured. Cooper v. Taylor, suPra; Thompson v. Latimer, 209 Ky. 491, 273 S. W. 65
(1925); Wason v. Colburn, 99 Mass. 342 (1868); Murphy v. Casey, 150 Minn. 107, 184
N. W. 783 (1921); In re Commissioners v. Yelverton, 204 N. C. 441, 168 S. E. SOS (1933);
First State Bank v. Conn., 136 Okla. 294, 277 Pac. 928 (1929); Well v. Marquis, 256 Pa.
608, 101 Ad. 70 (1917).
21. Succession of Le Blanc, 142 La. 27, 76 So. 223 (1917); Succession of Erwin, 169
La. 877, 126 So. 223 (1930); Talcott v. Bailey, 54 N. D. 19, 203 N. W. 549 (1926);
Barnovitch v. Horwatt, 173 A. 676 (Pa. 1934); Flood v. Libby, 38 Wash. 366, 80 Pac.
533 (1905).
But a general exemption statute will be deemed repealed by the enactment of a statute
specifying that exemption is limited to policies payable to persons other than the insured.
Elsom v. Gadd, 93 Wash. 603, 161 Pac. 483 (1916).
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4
Statutes Benefiting Wives
There are also statutes which create exemptions for the wife or chil-
dren which depend upon the amount of premium paid annually."2 These
were originally enacted at a time when a married woman suffered com-
mon law disabilities and when it was doubtful whether she had an insur-
able interest in the life of her husband." It was, therefore, provided
that she might insure her husband's life for her own benefit. And such
statutes have been interpreted to include cases in which the husband
took out the policy upon the fiction that he was acting as agent for the
wife. 4 In the following discussion reference will be made chiefly to
the New York statutes, although cases will be cited froni other juris-
dictions as well.
The first law, enacted in 1840, did not permit the husband to pay
any part of the premiums but the proceeds were exempted only if the
premiums did not exceed $300.25 Later this was modified so that the
exemption was lost only if the premiums paid by the husband exceeded
$300 a year.2" In 1870 the creditors were limited to the excess of
premiums paid above the prescribed limit, which was increased to $500.7
22. See notes 25-28 infra. In Pullis v. Robison, 73 Mo. 201 (1880), the court held
that a statute of this type was intended to restrict only insolvent husbands, leaving solvent
ones free to take out insurance for their wives in unlimited amounts, subject, however, to
apportionment to creditors of so much of the insurance as was produced by the payment
of premiums after insolvency. See criticism of the latter portion of this decision following
an amendment of the statute, in Sternberg v. Levy, 159 Mo. 617, 60 S. W. 1114 (1900).
In accord with the chief ruling is Red River National Bank v. DeBerry, 47 Tex. Civ, App.
96, 105 S. W. 998 (1907).
Some statutes do not limit the benefit of the exemption to the wife. See Holmes v.
Marshall, 145 Cal. 177, 79 Pac. 534 (1905); Lemp v. Lemp, 32 Idaho 397, 184 Pac. 222
(1919).
23. Felrath v. Schonfield, 76 Ala 199 (1894); Bertram v. Hopkins, 71 Conn. 505,
42 Atl. 645 (1899); Merchants', etc., Transportation Co. v. Borland, 53 N. J. Eq. 282, 31
AUt. 272 (1895); Barry v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 59 N. Y. 587 (1875); White-
head v. N. Y. Life Insurance Co., 102 N. Y. 143, 6 N. E. 267 (1886).
24. Felrath v. Schonfield, 76 Ala. 199 (1894); Houston v. Maddux, 179 Ill. 377, 53
N. E. 599 (1899); Whitehead v. New York Life Insurance Co., 102 N. Y. 143, 6 N. E
267 (1886); Guardian Trust Co. v. Straus, 139 App. Div. 884, 123 N. Y. Supp. 852
(1st Dep't 1910), aff'd, 201 N. Y. 546, 95 N. E. 1129 (1911); Anderson v. Northwestern
Mut. L. Ins. Co., 261 N. Y. 450, 185 N. E. 896 (1933).
25. N. Y. Laws 1840, c. 80. See also statutes referred to in In re Brown's Estate, 123
Cal. 399, 55 Pac. 1055 (1899); Merchants' and Miners' Transportation Co. v. Borland, 53
N. J. Eq. 282, 31 At]. 272 (1895).
26. N.,Y. Laws 1858, c. 187. See also statutes referred to in Felrath v. Schont)eld,
76 Ala. 199 (1894); Davis v. Cramer, 133 Ark. "224, 202 S. W. 239 (1918); PullIs V.
Robison, 73 Mo. 201 (1880); Red River Nat'l. Bank v. DeBerry, 47 Tex. Civ. App. 96,
105 S. W. 998 (1907).
27. N. Y. Laws 1870, c. 277. See also statutes referred to in In re Orear, 189 Fed.
888 (C. C. A. 8th, 1911); Harriman National Bank v. Huiet, 249 Fed. 856 (C. C. A. 4th,
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In 1896 the law was amended to provide that the amount of insurance
purchased with premiums in excess of $500 might be reached by the
creditors.2 That provision later became Section 52 of the Domestic
Relations Law. In 1927 this law was impliedly repealed by the enact-
ment of Section 55A of the Insurance LawY0
Problems have arisen in determining the amount available to creditors.
Premiums paid for the purpose of carrying loans must be deducted from
the total premium in order to determine whether the prescribed amount
has been exceeded, 30 and likewise an assessment paid to a benefit insur-
ance society cannot be considered." It is doubtful whether premiums
paid before the creditor's debt arose are to be taken into consideration.m 2
In any case the burden of proof is on the creditor to show what premiums
were actually paid by the husband out of his own property3
These statutes have been described as creating a lien on the policies,
but statements so general must be scrutinized with care. At the time
when the creditors' rights were in the excess premiums, an action was
permitted during the lifetime of the insured to impress the creditor's lien
on the policy itself's No instance has been found of a similar action
1917); In re Weick, 2 F. (2d) 647 (C. C. A. 6th, 1924); Bertram v. Hopkins, 71 Conn.
505, 42 At. 645 (1899).
28. N. Y. DoN S c RELATiONS LAW (1909) § 52. See also statutes referred to in
Kimball v. Cunningham Hardware Co., 197 Ala. 631, 73 So. 323 (1916); Baxter v. Old
National City Bank, 46 Ohio App. 533, 189 N. E. 514 (1933). In Calif. U. S. Bond &
Mortgage Corp. v. Crodzius, 34 P. (2d) 192 (Cal. App. 1934), it was held immaterial that
the widow had spent part of the money.
29. Chatham & Phenix National Bank v. Crosney, 251 N. Y. 189, 167 N. E. 217 (1929).
30. Kittel v. Domeyer, 175 N. Y. 205, 67 N. E. 433 (1903); Klee v. Hes3, 188 App.
Div. 322, 177 N. Y. Supp. 242 (3d Dep't 1919).
31. Dominick v. Stern, 79 Misc. 271, 139 N. Y. Supp. 59 (Sup. Ct. 1912), a.f'd, 157
App. Div. 944, 142 N. Y. Supp. 1115 (4th Dep't 1913), aff'd, 213 N. Y. 675, 107 N. E.
1075 (1914), because N. Y. INsum 'c" LAw (1909) § 212 completely exempts policies
in such societies.
32. Baron v. Brummer, 100 N. Y. 372, 3 N. E. 474 (1885).
But in Guardian Trust Co. v. Straus, 139 App. Div. 884, 123 N. Y. Supp. 852 (1t Dep't
1910), it was held immaterial when the premiums were paid on the ground that the action
was for the benefit of all the creditors, although it did not appear whether any premiums
had been paid before the earliest debt had been contracted.
33. Baron v. Brummer, 100 N. Y. 372, 3 N. E. 474 (1885); In re Thompon, 184
N. Y. 36, 76 N. E. 870 (1906); Guardian Trust Co. v. Straus, 139 App. Div. 884, 123
N. Y. Supp. 852 (1st Dep't 1910), afd, 201 N. Y. 546, 95 N. E. 1129 (1911). Accordingly,
where the wife has paid all the premiums the creditors can recover nothing. In re Goss'
Estate, 71 Hun. 120, 24 N. Y. Supp. 623 (Sup. Ct. 1893).
34. Kittel v. Domeyer, 175 N. Y. 205, 67 N. E. 433 (1903); In re Thompson 184 N. Y.
36, 76 N. E. 870 (1906); Guardian Trust Co. v. Straus, 139 App. Div. 884, 123 N. Y.
Supp. S52 (1st Dep't 1910), aff'd, 201 N. Y. 546, 95 N. E. 1129 (1911); Add's v. Selig.
264 N. Y. 274, 190 N. E. 490 (1934).
35. Stokes v. Amerman, 121 N. Y. 337, 24 N. E. 819 (18S9).
1935]
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under the later form of the statute, where the creditors' rights were only
in the proceeds.
The action, whether to recover premiums or proceeds, is a representa-
tive one for the benefit of all creditors and is maintainable only after
it appears that the insured's estate is insufficient for the payment of
his debts. 6 It is not, however, necessary for the creditor to wait until
the estate of the insured has been completely administered. 87 As the
proceeds are no part of the insured's estate the creditors' rights cannot
be administered in the probate court but should be the subject of an inde-
pendent action3 s
Statutes of this type have no extra-territorial effect.8  Therefore
creditors cannot under a statute of the state in which the insured died
lay claim to policies which were taken out in a different state, even
though the insured had become a resident of the state whose statute
was invoked and had paid premiums in that state for a number of
years.40
General language has been used to the effect that statutes such as
these were mere grants as concerns both the wife and the creditors. 41
And it has therefore been held that a wife could not claim that an in-
crease in creditors' rights violated the constitutional prohibition against
impairment of contracts.42 Whether the creditor could, after the insured's
death, similarly complain of diminution of his own rights was involved
in the recent case of Addiss v. Selig43 and not decided. That case I shall
later discuss in detail.
What rights the creditors have during the lifetime of the insured re-
mains uncertain. In New York the courts have been reluctant to permit
a receiver in supplementary proceedings to reach the surrender value
36. Kittel v. Domeyer, 175 N. Y. 205, 67 N. E. 433 (1903); In re Thompson, 184 N. Y
36, 76 N. E. 870 (1906); Guardian Trust Co. v. Straus, 139 App. Div. 884, 123 N. Y.
Supp. 852 (1st Dep't 1910), af'd, 201 N. Y. 546, 95 N. E. 1129 (1911); Quinby v.
Quinby, 221 App. Div. 532, 223 N. Y. Supp. 638 (1st Dep't 1927) (including real etate).
37. Guardian Trust Co. v. Straus, 139 App. Div. 884, 123 N. Y. Supp. 852 (1st Dep't
1910), aff'd, 201 N. Y. 546, 95 N. E. 1129 (1911).
3S. In re Thompson, 184 N. Y. 36, 76 N. E. 870 (1906). See also Wagner v. Thierlot,
203 App. Div. 757, 197 N. Y. Supp. 560 (1st Dep't 1922), aff'd, 236 N. Y. 588, 142 N. E.
295 (1923).
39." United States Mortgage & Trust Co. v. Ruggles, 258 N. Y. 32, 179 N. E. 250 (1932).
40. United States Mortgage & Trust Co. v. Ruggles, 258 N. Y. 32, 179 N. E. 250 (1932).
41. Baron v. Brummer, 100 N. Y. 372, 3 N. E. 474 (1885); Kittel v. Domeyer, 175
N. Y. 205, 67 N. E. 433 (1910); In re Thompson, 184 N. Y. 36, 76 N. E. 870 (1906).
42. Baron v. Brummer, 100 N. Y. 372, 3 N. E. 474 (1885); Kittel v. Domeyer, 175
N. Y. 205, 67 N. E. 433 (1903).
43. Note 34, supra.
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of policies payable to a wife, even though the insured reserved the right
to change the beneficiary."
On the other hand, where the insured had himself applied for the sur-
render value, a receiver was appointed to collect the sum due from the
insurance company.4 -In the federal courts, as already noted, the trustee
in bankruptcy has been allowed to obtain the surrender value.40 None
of these cases seems, however, to discuss the problem which arises where
the premiums paid are in excess of $500, so that it would be necessary
to apportion the surrender value, leaving to the insured the portion pur-
chased with the premiums of $500, and to creditors the balance. It is
probable that the amendment of the law in 1927 has deprived this prob-
lem of any further practical significance.
General Exemption Statutes
Section 55A of the Insurance Law of New York declares that the
beneficiary of a policy made payable to any one other than the insured,
or the assignee of a policy which has not been transferred in fraud of
creditors, is entitled to the proceeds of the policy free from claims of
creditors of the insured, whether or not the right to change the bene-
ficiary is reserved, allowing, however, to the creditors the right to re-
cover any premiums paid with intent to defraud them. Statutes of
other states vary in one way or another, sometimes exempting the poli-
cies rather than their proceeds.4
44. Maurice v. Travelers Ins. Co., 121 M isc. 427, 201 N. Y. Supp. 369 (Sup. Ct. 1923),
approved in Gershman v. Berliner, 214 App. Div. 196, 211 N. Y. Supp. 881 (Ist Dep't
1925). Earlier cases had permitted such policies to be reached by creditors: Cavagnaro
v. Thompson, 78 Misc. 687, 138 N. Y. Supp. 819 (Sup. Ct. 1912); Clark v. Shaw, 91
Misc. 245, 154 N. Y. Supp. 1101 (County Ct. 1915); Hall v. Hess, 97 Misc. 331, 161 N. Y.
Supp. 418 (Sup. Ct. App. Term 1916); Ecker v. Meyer, 118 Misc. 356, 194 N. Y. Supp. 320,
118 Misc. 443, 194 N. Y. Supp. 654 (N. Y. City Ct. 1922), reversed on question of practice,
119 Misc. 375, 196 N. Y. Supp. 26S (Sup. Ct. App. Term 1922).
45. Scobie v. Connor, 94 Misc. 429, 157 N. Y. Supp. 507 (Sup. Ct. 1922).
46. See cases cited in notes 12-14, supra.
47. See N. Y. DEBTOR AND CRanrroR L.w (1925) §§ 273, 275 for cases discu-sing such
fraud. In re Sturdevant, 29 F. (2d) 795 (W. D. N. Y. 1928); In re Newberger, 1 F. Supp.
685 (W. D. Okla. 1932); Cole v. Marple, 98 Ill. 58 (1381); Houston v. Mladduxw, 179 III.
377, 53 N. E. 599 (1899); York v. Flaherty, 210 Mass. 35, 96 N. E. 53 (1911).
See also references to statutes in: Murphyv. Casey, 150 M1mn. 107,184 N. W. 783 (1921);
First State Bank v. Conn., 136 Ok . 294, 277 Pac. 928 (1929); Well v. Marquw, 256 Pa.
608, 101 Ati. 70 (1917).
In Johnson v. Bacon, 92 Miss. 156, 45 So. 858 (190S), the court held that the insurance
above that exempted by law was liable for premiums paid by an insolvent to maintain
the exempt amount. In York v. Flaherty, supra, payments made within six years of
death were recovered and no deduction permitted because there were loans on the policy.
48. Ralph v. Cox, 1 F. (2d) 435 (C. C. A. 8th, 1924); In re Weick 2 F. (2d) 647
(C. C. A. 6th, 1924); Irving Bank v. Alexander, 280 Pa. 466, 124 AU. 634 (1924).
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In general these statutes have been interpreted to apply to endow-
ment policies.4" Disability payments are exempt when payable to the
beneficiary or assigned to the beneficiary, 0 but not when the payments
are made to the insured himself,5 ' or when the assignment was in fraud
of creditors. 2 In 1934, however, New York enacted on the subject of
disability payments a specific section which exempts payments made by
any life, health or casualty insurance corporation, regardless of the per-
son to whom such payments are to be made."3
As has already been pointed out, these statutes are construed to
include the surrender value of the policies. 4 In the recent case of
49. In re Churchill, 209 Fed. 766 (C. C. A. 7th, 1913); Smith v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 43 F. (2d) 74 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1930); In re Hurwitz, 3 F. Supp. 16 (N. Y. 1933);
Charles Hing v. Joe Lee, 37 Cal. App. 313, 174 Pac. 356 (1918); Pulsifer v. Hu-sey, 97
Me. 434, 54 Atl. 1076 (1903); Flood v. Libby, 38 Wash. 366, 80 Pac. 533 (1905).
In the Hurwitz case, but not in the Smith case, the court ruled that if the insured lived
to the expiration of the endowment period the trustee might recover the surrender
value as of the time of filing.
When the endowment period has expired creditors can reach the proceeds regardless
of who is named as beneficiary in the event of death. Wason v. Colburn, 99 Mass, 342
(1868); Talcott v. Field, 34 Neb. 611, 52 N. W. 400 (1892); Ellison v. Straw, 119 Wis.
502, 97 N. W. 168 (1903).
In some jurisdictions endowment policies are expressly included in the exempting
statute. Scott v. Wamsley, 253 N. W. 524 (Iowa 1934); Schuler v. Johnson, 246 N. W.
632 (S. D. 1933) (limited in amount).
50. Wittman v. Littlefield, 142 Misc. 916, 256 N. Y. Supp. 471 (Sup. Ct. 1932), afl'd,
235 App. Div. 831, 257 N. Y. Supp. 885 (1st Dep't 1932). But not if insured is the sole
beneficiary. Lion Credit Union v. Gutman, 148 Misc. 620, 265 N. Y. Supp. 979 (N. Y.
City Ct. 1932). However, where the statute exempts policies payable to the insured,
disability payments are likewise exempt. Barnovitch v. Horwatt, 173 AtI. 676 (Pa. 1934)
51. In re Kern, 8 F. Supp. 246 (S. D. N. Y. 1934); Murdy v. Skyles, 101 Iowa 549,
70 N. W. 714 (1897); Chattanooga Sewer Pipe Works v. Dunbar, 153 Mis. 276, 120
So. 450 (1929); Herbach v. Herbach, 148 Misc. 33, 265 N. Y. Supp. 14 (N. Y. City
Ct. 1933); Baxter v. Old National City Bank, 46 Ohio App. 533, 189 N. E. 514 (1933).
But see In re Commissioner of Banks v. Yelverton, 204 N. C. 441, 168 S. E. 505 (1933)
(permitting the insured to retain the monthly disability payments under a statute exempting
all property to a limited amount).
52. Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co., Inc. v. Wishner, 147 Misc. 828, 147 Misc. 829, 265
N. Y. Supp. 184 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
53. N. Y. INSURANcE LAW § 55-b effective May 14, 1934, expressly applies to debts
incurred before, as well as after, the disability. In accordance with the ruling in Addiss v.
Selig, 264 N. Y. 274, 190 N. E. 490 (1934), this section will not apply to debts in
existence at the time of its enactment.
For statutes of other states see: Holmes v. Marshall, 145 Cal. 177, 79 Pac. 534 (1905);
Scott v. Wamsley, 253 N. W. 524 (Iowa 1934).
54. In addition to the cases cited in notes 11, 15, 16, supra, see: Holden v. Stratton,
198 U. S. 202 (1905); Davis v. Cramer, 133 Ark. 224, 202 S. W. 239 (1918); Grems v.
Traver, 87 Misc. 644, 148 N. Y. Supp. 200 (Sup. Ct. 1914), atl'd, 164 App. Dlv. 968, 149
N. Y. Supp. 1085 (4th Dep't 1914); Dawson v. National Life Ins. Co., 156 Tenn. 306, 300
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Schwartz v. Holzman"' the Circuit Court' of Appeals held exempt the sur-
render value which, at the direction of the husband, was paid to the
beneficiary, his wife, shortly before his own bankruptcy. The court
recognized, of course, that a different rule would have been applied bad
the husband himself obtained the money. It reached this result, al-
though the wife could not have compelled the surrender of the policy,
on the ground that the'statute should be liberally construed.
Dividends are probably also exempt when allowed to accumulate for
the benefit of the beneficiary"0 or if applied in reduction of current
premiums.a According to the cases just referred to it is only when the
insured has elected to receive the dividend that it can be reached by
his creditors.
Retroactivity
These statutes are not applicable to policies which, either because of
the expiration of an endowment term or because of the insured's death,
have matured prior to their enactment 8  In such cases the rights of
creditors had already attached. Many of the statutes expressly apply to
policies already in existence."2 It has been intimated that in the absence
of such provision the law would not apply to such policies.cO I submit
that this is a misconception of the nature of an exemption statute, such
as these insurance statutes are. The general rule is that all exemption
statutes apply as of the time they are invoked."' It can make no differ-
S. W. 507 (1928); Cannons v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 203 Wis. 452, 243 N. W. 320
(1932).
In some states the statute is explicit on the subject; Cooper v. Taylor, 54 F. (2d) 105S
(C. C. A. 5th, 1923); Murphy v. Casey, 150 Minn. 107, 184 N. W. 783 (1921); Dreyfus
v. Barton, 98 Miss. 768, 54 So. 254 (1911); Schuler v. Johnson, 246 N. W. 632 (S. D.
1933).
55. 69 F. (2d) 814 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934).
56. See New York Plumbers Specialties Co. Inc. v. Stein, 140 Mlisc. 161, 140 N. Y.
Supp. 220 (Sup. Ct. App. Term 1931). Contra: where insured has right to withdraw them.
Ellison v. Straw, 119 Wis. 502, 97 N. W. 168 (1903).
57. Randik Realty Corp. v. Moseyeff, 147 Misc. 618, 263 N. Y. Supp. 440 (N. Y. City
Ct. 1933).
58. United States Mortgage & Trust Co. v. Ruggles, 258 N. Y. 32, 179 N. E. 250
(1923); Well v. Marquis, 256 Pa. 608, 101 AtL 70 (1917). Contra: Cros v. Armstrong,
44 Ohio St. 613, 10 N. E. 160 (1887).
59. In re Morse, 206 Fed. 350 (D. Kan. 1912); Addiss v. Selig, 264 N. Y. 274, 190
N. E. 490 (1934); In re Commissioners v. Yelverton, 204 N. C. 441, 168 S. E. 505 (1933);
Well v. Marquis, 256 Pa. 608, 101 AtL 70 (1917); Skinner v. Holt, 9 S. D. 427, 69 N. W.
595 (1896).
60. Well v. Marquis, 256 Pa. 603, 101 Atl. 70 (1917).
61. Quackenbush v. Danks, 1 Denio 127, aff'd, 1 N. Y. 129 (1848); Morse v. Goold,
11 N. Y. 281 (1854); Laird v. Carton, 196 N. Y. 169, 89 N. E. 822 (1909); Brearley v.
Ward, 201 N. Y. 358, 94 N. E. 1001 (1911).
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ence when the property on which the creditor seeks to levy was ac-
quired, although it may make a difference when the creditor's claim
arose. There is no reason why insurance policies should be subjected
to a treatment different from that accorded to any other property. Con-
-sequently these statutes should be declared applicable to insurance
policies no matter when taken out.
It remains to be considered to what extent the policies may be ap-
plicable to pre-existing creditors and, if so applicable, whether they
violate the contract clause of the Constitution. The question of inter-
pretation will be considered irrespective of the difficulty presented by
the constitutional problem. Most of the decisions commonly cited on
this subject fail to keep the distinction clear." But for the shadow
of the contract clause it is doubtful whether any court would declare
that a statute which states that the proceeds of insurance policies shall
be free from the claims of creditors was intended to apply only to
creditors whose claims subsequently arose.
However, the Court of Appeals of New York in A ddiss v. Selig,"5
mindful of the constitutional problem, 4 held that Section 55A of the
Insurance Law was not intended to apply to existing creditors. The
court reached this conclusion partly on the ground that the creditors had
a lien 5 which should not be disturbed in the absence of clear language
in the amending law, and partly on the ground that this law, by expressly
mentioning pre-existing policies and not mentioning pre-existing creditors,
must have meant to exclude them. Judge Crane said:
62. In re Bonvillain, 232 Fed. 370 (E. D. La. 1916), aff'd, 237 Fed. 1015 (C. C. A.
5th, 1917), cert. dismissed, 248 U. S. 588 (1918); In re Messinger, 29 F. (2d) 158 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1928), cert. denied, 279 U. S. 855 (1929); Fearn v. Ward, 65 Ala. 33 (1880);
Addiss v. Selig, 264 N. Y. 274, 190 N. E. 490 (1934); In re Commissioners v. Yelverton,
204 N. C. 441, 168 S. E. 505 (1933); Well v. Marquis, 256 Pa. 608, 101 Atl. 70 (1917);
Trust Co. v. Fay, sometimes cited as In re Heilbron's Estate, 14 Wash. 536, 45 Pac.
153 (1896).
The courts in these cases appear to have misapplied the maxim that a statute should be
so construed as to save it from being declared unconstitutional. That maxim Is prac-
tically applicable only when by such construction the purpose of the statute can be
accomplished. For cases of this character see Sage v. Brooklyn, 89 N. Y. 189 (1882);
People v. Feitner, 191 N. Y. 88, 83 N. E. 592 (1908). The maxim has no validity
when a construction which upholds the constitutionality of the act destroys the purpose
for which the act was enacted. Nothing is thus accomplished except to save the court
from passing on the constitutional problem.
63. 264 N. Y. 274, 190 N. E. 490 (1934).
64. Citing Gunn v. Barry, 82 U. S. 610 (1872); Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. S95
(1877); Bank of Minden v. Clement, 256 U. S. 126 (1921); Coombes v. Getz, 285 U. S.
434 (1932).
65. Citing Matter of Thompson, 184 N. Y. 36, 76 N. E. 870 (1906).
66. The statute reads: "If a policy of insurance, whether heretofore or hereafter
issued ...
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"Note must be taken of the phraseology of the section. It makes no refer-
ence to pre-existing creditors although it does apply to a policy of insurance
theretofore issued. This statute may be read so as to apply to pre-existing
policies without affecting pre-existing creditors. In other words, it is quite
reasonable to suppose that cases would arise where policies were existing prior
to Mlarch 31, 1927, although the debts were not incurred until after that date.
As to such subsequent creditors this section was valid. We give this section
such a meaning, rather than one of doubtful legality, in making it apply to
creditors in the plaintiffs' class. This no doubt is what this court had in mind
when it said in United States Mortgage & Trust Co. v. Ruggles (253 N. Y.
32, p. 39), referring to the repeal of the exception in Section 52 of the Do-
mestic Relations Law, 'The rights of the plaintiff were not affected by the
repeal, as nothing indicates that it was the intention of the Legislature to
prejudice the rights of creditors in the proceeds of policies due or paid prior
to the new enactment (Hollenbach v. Born, 238 N. Y. 34), and if such was
the intention the Constitution would frustrate it. (Bank of Minden v. Clement,
256 U. S. 126.)' Although this statement was not necessary to thedecision,
and appears to apply to past due policies, yet it indicates the impression which
the court had at the time that this legislation was prospective in all particulars
except for the one express reservation-its application to pre-existing policies.
It does not apply to pre-existing claims of creditors."
With the mystery of legislative draftsmanship only the courts of last
resort can deal. It may be observed, however, that the express mention
of pre-existing policies was devoid of meaning unless the legislature
intended the statute to apply to pre-existing creditors. Subsequent
creditors would have no rights in any policies, whether they existed at
the date of the new law or not. Existing creditors might have none
in newly created policies. 7 It is probable that the legislature had in
mind that existing creditors might, however, have rights in existing
policies. In connection with the proper interpretation of the New
York law it should be borne in mind that prior to its enactment,
Pennsylvania had amended a general law"8 so as expressly to exclude
the claims of pre-existing creditorsc9 in order to obviate the suggestion
that the earlier law, if applied to pre-existing creditors, might be uncon-
stitutional. 70 The case illustrates the necessity for the greatest care in
draftsmanship.
67. See Cecilian Operating Corp. v. Berkwit, 151 Misc. 814, 272 N. Y. Supp. 291
(Sup. Ct. 1934). This holding may, however, be contrary to the decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States discussed hereafter, notes 76, 77, infra.
68. PA. STAT. (1920) § 12262.
69. PA. STAT. (1930) Tit. 40, § 517.
70. Well v. Marquis, 256 Pa. 608, 101 AUt. 70 (1917).
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Constitutional Problems
In considering the constitutionality of a statute which attempts to
deprive existing creditors of their rights, the important question is
whether the proceeds of insurance were the property of the insured or
of the beneficiary. There can be no doubt that if the property is that
of the insured, who is the debtor, no statute can deprive existing creditors
of their rights.71  This doctrine was established by the United States
Supreme Court when it condemned remedial legislation enacted follow-
ing the depression which succeeded the panic of 1837.72 Shortly after
the Civil War the doctrine was extended to apply to increases in exemp-
tions.73 In some of the states these principles were not long thereafter
applied in condemnation of statutes exempting the proceeds of life
insurance policies.74
And since a creditor is entitled to rely upon his debtor's industry to
the end of time," the Supreme Court held in Bank of Minden v.
Clement76 that it can make no difference that the policy was acquired
after the debt was incurred. The Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed
these principles in W. B. Worthen Company v. Thomas.7  That case
dealt with a statute of Arkansas which not only exempted the proceeds
of policies but also declared that no process should issue to reach them.
The benefit of this statute was claimed by the beneficiary under a policy
which had matured by the death of the insured prior to the enactment
of the new law. Indeed, a writ of garnishment had been served upon
the insurance company before the law was enacted. The state Supreme
Court held the law applicable and constitutional. 8 Chief Justice Hughes,
in reversing this determination, said:
"Such an exemption, applied in the case of debts owing before the exemption
was created by the legislature, constitutes an unwarrantable interference with
the obligation of contracts in violation of the constitutional provision....
The argument of appellee that a judgment is not in itself a contract within
the constitutional protection, and that it is competent for the State to alter
or modify forms of remedies, is unavailing. The judgment and garnishment
in the instant case afforded the appropriate means of enforcing the contractual
71. See cases cited in notes 16, 62 supra and notes 72-77 infra.
72. Bronson v. Kenzie, 42 U. S. 311 (1843); McCracken v. Hayward, 43 U. S. 608
(1844).
73. Gunn v. Barry, 82 U. S. 595 (1873); Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595 (1877).
74. Skinner v. Holt, 9 S. D. 427, 69 N. W. 595 (1896); Trust Co. v. Fay, 14 Wash.
536, 45 Pac. 153 (1896) ; Rice v. Smith, 72 Miss. 42, 16 So. 417 (1894).
75. See Marshall, *C. J., in Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U. S. 122, 198 (1819).
76. 256 U. S. 126 (1921).
77. 292 U. S. 426 (1934).
78. 65 S. W. (2d) 917 (Ark. 1934).
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obligations of the firm of which appellee was a member and the statute altered
substantial rights."
An attempt to justify the statute by reason of an existing emergency"
was disposed of and the Minnesota moratorium case 0 was distinguished
on the ground that the exemption in the Arkansas law was not limited
"as to time, amount, circumstances or need." In connection with this
phase of the case Justice Sutherland, speaking also for Justices Van
Devanter, McReynolds and Butler, reiterated their views in the Minne-
sota case:
"We were unable then, as we are now, to concur in the view that an emergency
can ever justify, or, what is really the same thing, can ever furnish an occa-
sion for justifying, a nullification of the constitutional restriction upon state
power in respect of the impairment of contractual obligations. Acceptance
of such a view takes us beyond the fixed and secure boundaries of the funda-
mental law into a precarious fringe of extraconstitutional territory in which
no real boundaries exist. We reject as unsound and dangerous doctrine, threat-
ening the stability of the deliberately framed and wise provisions of the Con-
stitution, the notion that violations of those provisions may be measured by
the length of time they are to continue or the extent of the infraction, and that
only those of long duration or of large importance are to be held bad."
In bankruptcy, as previously mentioned, the contract clause had gen-
erally been successfully invoked to protect the rights of existing creditors
in surrender value.8 ' However, in a recent case the creditor was de-
prived of any rights in the insurance policy because his claim at the
time of the enactment of the exemption law was merely a contingent
one and therefore not then provable, although at the time of bankruptcy
the contingency had occurred and the claim had been proved.12
But all these cases under the contract clause rest upon the proposition
that a creditor is entitled to the same relief against his debtor's prop-
erty as he had when he contracted the debt, these rights of enforcement
having become part of the contract and therefore not to be impaired
under the Constitution. No case has been found in which a creditor's
rights to pursue property not that of his debtor has been held within
such protection.
Cases such as Hawthorne v. Cale f3 and Coombes v. Getz,8 4 which
deal with the right of a creditor of a corporation to enforce the statulory
79. The statute, however, made no express mention of any emergency.
go. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398 (1934).
81. See cases cited notes 12-14, 16, supra.
Except where state statutes exempt---see notes 11, 19, 16, 54, supra.
82. In re Crayton, 56 F. (2d) 282 (W. D. N. Y. 1932).
83. 69 U. S. 10 (1865).
84. 285 U. S. 434 (1932).
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liability of stockholders or directors, are not really examples to the con-
trary. Although the right is enforced against a person other than the
debtor, it is really a property right of the debtor which is in itself in
question. Therefore, the supposed analogy with insurance cases falls
because the estate of the insured never has a claim against the beneficiary.
Ordinarily a life insurance policy payable to a named beneficiary is
in no sense the debtor's property and is not reachable by his creditors.
As has been said, a man's life constitutes no part of his assets.8s The
creditor may be able to reach the products of his debtor's industry so
long as they remain his own. He cannot, in the absence of fraud, reach
gifts his debtor has made to another s.8  And life insurance policies pay-
able to a wife or other beneficiary are in effect such gifts. Where, as
under the Domestic Relations Law, Section 52, creditors have been
given limited rights in the proceeds of policies although payable to some
third person, can such rights be lessened or taken away?
It has already been pointed out that in the Addiss case"' it was held
that the legislature did not intend to affect these rights; and the court
suggested that to do so might be unconstitutional. The problem will
now be considered on the assumption that the New York legislature
may in the future expressly include existing creditors in Section 55A
of the Insurance Law, the present exemption statute. What are the con-
stitutional consequences?
In the Addiss case, it was argued on behalf of defendant, that the
contract clause had not been violated because the insurance policies
were never the property of the debtor. Counsel for the plaintiffs con-
tended that this argument did not apply as to policies in which there
was a right reserved to change the beneficiary, and that where such right
was reserved the policies are the property of the debtor, so that creditors'
rights are protected by the contract clause. It can make no difference
after the death of the insured whether or not a right to change the bene-
ficiary had been reserved.
All the cases which have interpreted Section 52 of the Domestic Rela-
tions Law have emphasized that policies taken out under that section are
the property of the wife, not of the husband."' It has already been
pointed out that no part of the proceeds are properly administered as
part of the husband's estate in the Surrogate's Court 0 and that a receiver
85. Bailey v. Wood, 202 Mass. 549, 89 N. E. 147 (1909). See also Shaver v. Shaver
35 App. Div. 1, 54 N. Y. Supp. 464 (3d Dep't 1898.)
86. Central National Bank of Washington v. Hume, 128 U. S. 195 (1888).
87. Note 34, supra.
88. Whitehead v. New York Life Ins. Co., 102 N. Y. 143, 6 N. E. 267 (1886); Anderson
v. Northwestern Mut. L. Ins. Co., 261 N. Y. 450, 185 N. E. 896 (1933).
89. In re Thompson, 184 N. Y. 36, 76 N. E. 870 (1906).
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in supplementary proceedings cannot reach such policies.0 0 Nor is it
possible to attach their possible cash surrender value on a debt of the
husband, even though he has reserved the right to change the bene-
ficiary. 1 It is true that many courts have said that where such right
is reserved the wife has no vested interest but merely a contingent oneY
However, these cases speak as of the husband's lifetime. It would,
therefore, be more correct to say that such reservation does not affect
the wife's ownership but merely acts as a conditional limitation upon
such ownership, and that her interest in the proceeds is ultimately
vested. 33 The courts almost unanimously recognize that after the hus-
band's death the beneficiary is the sole owner of the policy so that a
creditor of the beneficiary may reach the proceedsY4  (Of course, there
90. See cases cited in note 44, supra.
91. Chelsea Exchange Bank v. Travelers Ins. Co., 173 App. Div. 829, 160 N. Y. Supp,
225 (1st Dep't 1916).
92. Eltonhead v. Travelers Ins. Co., 177 App. Div. 170, 163 N. Y. Supp. 338 (Ist
Dep't 1917); McGowin v. Menken, 223 N. Y. 509, 119 N. E. 877 (1918); Schoenboltz
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 234 N. Y. 24, 136 N. E. 227 (1922); Jorgensen v. De r'ney,
57 N. D. 63, 222 N. W. 464 (1928); 0etting v. Sparks, 109 Ohio St. 94, 143 N. E. 184
,(1923); Katz v. Ohio Natl Bank, 127 Ohio St. 531, 191 N. E. 782 (1934). In Resnerk v.
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 190 N. E. 603 (Mass. 1934), the beneficiary's interest is described as
a "qualified vested interest".
93. Chase Natl Bank v. United States, 278 U. S. 327, 334 (1929); In re Rose, 24 F.
(2d) 253 (E. D. Pa. 1927, aff'd, 24 F. (2d) 254 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1928), cert. denied 227 U. S.
593 (1928); Wirgman v. Miller, 98 Ky. 620, 33 S. W. 937 (1896); Tyler v. Treasurer and
Receiver General, 226 Blass. 306, 115 N. E. 300 (1917); Grems v. Traver, 87 Misc. 644,
148 N. Y. Supp. 200 (Sup. Ct. 1914), aff'd, 164 App. Div. 968, 149 N. Y. Supp. 1035
(1914); Chelsea Exchange Bank v. Travelers Ins. Co., 173 App. Div. 829, 160 N. Y. Supp.
225 (1st Dep't 1916); Wagner v. Thieriot 203 App. Div. 757, 197 N. Y. Supp. 560 (1st
Dep't 1922), aff'd, 236 N. Y. 588, 142 N. E. 295 (1923); Maurice v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
121 Misc. 427, 201 N. Y. Supp. 369 (Sup. Ct. 1923); Mahoney v. Eaton, 123 Misc.
231, 205 N. Y. Supp. 707 (Sup. Ct. 1924), aff'd, 212 App. Div. 867, 208 N. Y. Supp. 898
(1st Dep't 1925); Weil v. Marquis, 256 Pa. 608, 110 At!. 70 (1917); Irving Bank v.
Alexander, 280 Pa. 466, 124 At!. 634 (1924).
94. Reighart v. Harris, 6 Kan. App. 339, 51 Pac. 788 (1897); Goldman v. Moses, 191
N. E. 873 (Mass. 1934); Goza v. Provine, 140 Miss. 315, 10S So. 534 (1925); Amberg v.
Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 171 N. Y. 314, 63 N. E. 1111 (1902); Jackson v. Talnadge,
246 N. Y. 133, 158 N. E. 48 (1927); Sam Levy & Co. v. Davis, 125 Tenn. 342, 142 S. W.
1118 (1911); Reiff v. Armour & Co., 79 Wash. 48, 139 Pac. 633 (1914).
Some courts, however, have interpreted statutes as exempting from debts of the beneficiary
despite their apparent restriction to debts of the insured. Schillinger v. Boes, 85 Ky. 357,
3 S. W. 427 (1887); Brown v. Balfour, 46 Binn. 68, 48 N. W. 604 (1891); First State
Bank v. Conn., 136 Okla. 294, 277 Pac. 928 (1929); Whiteside v. Fischer, 250 N. W. 60
(S. D. 1933).
In other states siilnar results have been reached because of the particular language of
the statute, although it contained no express mention of the debts of beneficiaries: Holmes
v. Marshall, 145 Cal. 177, 79 Pac. 534 (1905); Gernan-American Bank v. Goodman, 83
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are statutes, particularly those relating to cooperative or fraternal bene-
fit societies, which exempt the proceeds not only from the creditors of
the assured but also from the creditors of the beneficiary.)"5
From the constitutional point of view it can make no difference after
the insured's death, that there was ever a reserved right to change the
beneficiary if, during the insured's lifetime, the creditor has not taken
advantage of such rights as he had under the law to reach the surren-
der value. At no time has the insured any property interest in the
proceeds which are to become available upon his death. Any rights
which the insured's creditors might therefore assert under Section 52
of the Domestic Relations Law in the proceeds of a policy payable to
a wife are not rights in the debtor's property. Such rights are not within
the contemplation of the contract clause of the Constitution. It is sug-
gested, therefore, that the New York legislature might constitutionally
amend the law either by repealing Section 52 of the Domestic Relations
Law or by changing Section 55A of the Insurance Law so as to exempt
from the claims of pre-existing creditors the proceeds of life insurance
payable to the wife. In this way the legislature could round out the
main purpose of Section 55A of the Insurance Law, which is to remove
that anomaly, as the result of which a wife stands .in a position less'
favorable than any other named beneficiary91
Wash. 231, 145 Pac. 221 (1915) (In this case, this was limited, however, to debts of
the beneficiary existing at the time she was entitled to receive the proceeds).
In New York, because of prohibitions in the statute against assignment of policies by
the wife without the husband's consent, it has been held that during the lifetime of the
husband creditors of the wife can obtain no rights in policies payable to her. Eadle v
Slimmon, 26 N. Y. 9 (1862); Smillie v. Quinn, 90 N. Y. 492 (1881); Miller v. Campbell,
140 N. Y. 457, 35 N. E. 651 (1893); cf. Ellison v. Straw, 116 Wis. 207, 92 N. W. 1094
(1903).
For statutory protection afforded beneficiaries see note 95, infra.
95. In re Tellier's Estate, 201 Iowa 126, 230 N. W. 545 (1930) (the exemption does
not enure to the benefit of the wife's heirs). Contra: Coleman v. McGraw, 71 Neb. 801,
99 N. W. 663 (1904); Scott v. Wamsley, 253 N. W. 524 (Iowa 1934) (the exemption enurcs
to the benefit of the wife although she was not named in the policy since she took by
operation of law); Mason v. Martin, 57 S. D. 299, 232 N. W. 29 (1930). (The statutes
of these states limit the amount of exemption to $5,000 and to debts incurred by the wife
before her husband's death).
In New York, PERsoNAL. PRoPERTY LAW, (1909) § 15, exempts from garnishment
benefits accruing under an agreement whereby the proceeds of a policy are left with the
insurance company in trust for the beneficiary, provided the agreement so provides.
Accordingly, monthly payments due under such a policy, whether principal or income, are
exempt. Crossman Co. v. Ranch, 263 N. Y. 264, 188 N. E. 748 (1934).
For cases dealing specifically with cooperative assessment or fraternal benefit societies
see Etterson v. Schwartz, 38 Misc. 669, 78 N. Y. Supp. 231 (Sup. Ct. 1902); Peoples Bank
of Buffalo v. Cushman. 109 App. Div. 349, 95 N. Y. Supp. 882 (4th Dep't 1905), afJ'd,
187 N. Y. 518, 79 N. E. 1113 (1907).
96. Chatham & Phenix National Bank v. Crosney, 251 N. Y. 189, 167 N. E. 217
(1929) ; United States Mortgage & Trust Co. v. Ruggles, 258 N. Y. 32, 179 N. E. 250 (1932).
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